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It was as part of reaffirming faith in Deng Xiaoping thought that the 15th Party Congress, held during September 
1997-the first one after Deng’s death-had formally endorsed China’s pragmatism in international affairs by 
underlining ‘multilateralism’ as the guiding core-principle for its foreign policy initiatives and operations.i This new 
thesis on multilateralism was further elaborated during China’s 16th Party Congress during 2002 and it has since 
come to be the critical premise in China’s fourth generation leadership’s on-going quest for socio-economic 
development and nation-building as China comes to be accepted as the challenger next global power. As a result, 
China has gradually moved from treating multilateralism as supplementary to its bilateral approach in foreign 
relations to making it complimentary-and even as the predominant approach in some cases. Since then, some people 
even have begun to hoist multilateralism as synonymous for the foreign policy of China.ii
It is in this evolving new context of China’s fundamental shift from once being completely inward-looking and 
largely conducting its foreign policy either in the communist ideological framework or purely through bilateral 
channels to its steady long march towards evolving a far more broad-based multilateralism as the primary instrument 
of its expanding activism in international affairs that this paper tries to examine and highlight the emerging contours 
of China’s new foreign policy thinking and to gauge its future in ensuring a peaceful rise of China in the coming 
years.
The New Context 
In the new context today, China’s evolving new understanding on multilateralism is seen as gradually beginning 
to fit into the well developed Western academic industry on multilateralism whose definitions remain overcast on 
both the theory and practice of international relations discourse worldwide. To cite some of them, these may include 
well-known Western scholars such as Robert Keohane, who talks of it as “the practice of coordinating national 
policies in groups of three or more states”, or John Ruggie, who talks of “indivisibility” and “diffused reciprocity” 
and so on.iii In operative terms as well, China’s relations with ASEAN, for example, remain a visible example where 
China’s multilateralism pervades much of China’s foreign policy initiatives and interactions with other players. 
As for the proverbial element of the ‘Chinese characteristics’ in China’s conception and practice of 
‘multilateralism’, China’s multilateralism remains selective and as yet focused primarily on China’s peripheral 
regions. Starting from its Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and then launching its Boao Forum, China has been 
trying to evolve and project, what Chinese call their alternative paradigms’ of conducting inter-state relations. 
Indeed, a whole chain of economic and soft-security frameworks in Asia have since come to be the dominant 
operative foreign policy channels for China’s such efforts which remain aimed at discarding the old cold war 
mindset of physical security through State centric military alliances to genuine multilateralism. 
Besides, apart from being a key in resolving China’s external equations, multilateralism also remains a key to 
China’s need for continued rapid development which remains essential pre-requisite for ensuring its political 
stability and internal peace in the long-run.iv This part of China’s multilateralism has since evolved in terms of 
China seeking to ensure peace on its borders to now it seeking to ensure peace and stability in its border regions 
which again was formally institutionalized during the 16th Party Congress on 2002. China’s Boao Forum perhaps 
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represents one such example of China’s new vision of multilateralism with special focus on economic development 
and regional focus. At the global level as well China has become active in seeking space in regional and global 
economic forums with World Trade Organization emerging as one major example. 
Genesis and Evolution 
To understand the evolution of China’s concept of multilateralism, one has to begin with China’s particularly 
negative experience with multilateral institutions e.g. its being kept out of the United Nations (UN) and its 
institutions during its initial decades as also for its being the target of UN censure and sanctions (for Korean War) 
during those years. The things were to begin to change following the Sino-US entente and China’s entry into the UN 
and other multilateral institutions from late 1970s. Another watershed change to coincide with late 1970s was the 
rise of Deng Xiaoping to power in China. Deng’s economic reforms were to become the driving force behind 
China’s decisive shift towards multilateral institutions. 
According to Zhang Baijia, expert at the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central School in Beijing, various 
internal and external developments during the first half of 1980s were to significantly influence Deng’s strategic 
thinking in three major ways: (a) Deng aborted the long-held view that ‘world war is inevitable’ and instead 
emphasizes on ‘peace and development’ as central theme for contemporary China; (b) Deng acknowledged that the 
contemporary world is heterogeneous in nature and that conflicts coexist with cooperation and competition with 
interdependence; and (c) Deng maintained that independence does not equal isolation and self-reliance does not 
mean rejecting all foreign things as had been the case during Mao’s times.v Change in Deng’s worldview was to 
result in change in China’s approach towards international institution and towards the whole idea about 
multilateralism. As a result, the whole of 1980s witnessed unprecedented qualitative and quantitative changes as 
China gradually involved itself in not only international organizations in the political domain but also expanded its 
participation in economic and security types of multilateral forums.vi
As regards China’s future vision on multilateralism, it has been goaded primarily by China’s felt need (a) for 
undermining the basis of United States’ unilateralism and its global power profile and (b) for making efforts to 
become acceptable as the benign rising power amongst its immediate neighbours and amongst the world at large. By 
far these two remain China’s most important foreign policy challenges though its rise as a major power has already 
been accepted as a given reality in general. The conditions have also been facilitated by external dynamics, 
especially following the collapse of former Soviet Union which has shifted the focus of international relations and 
led to the widening of the whole understanding of security and strategic equations amongst major players thus 
moving the dynamic of international power politics beyond two super powers to include new actors like China. 
New Thinking, New Style 
As regards China, several commentaries see this shift as a fundamental shift in China’s worldview which has 
gradually moved from being one that was introvert and focused on achieving economic progress in terms of 
independence and ‘self-sufficiency’ of Chairman Mao’s years to gradually reorienting towards strengthening 
China’s external links and accepting its growing interdependence with the external world. Even though much of this 
new thinking had been put in place during the life time of Deng Xiaoping—which had witnessed the opening up of 
China’s economy—it was further expanded during the tenure of President Jiang Zemin making China’s foreign 
trade and foreign direct investment as the two key locomotives of its rapid development through the 1990s. The 
same has seen further expansion under the new leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao who have 
since provided a whole new style and content to China’s foreign relations. 
Nevertheless, China’sthinking and style of operations on multi-lateralism remain in continuous evolution and has 
its own shortcomings and pitfalls. China’s evolving focus on multilateral diplomacy, as a result, -despite its 
backdrop of strong military and economic power-remains as yet fairly nascent, fragile and selective. This is, of 
course, not exclusive to China’s foreign policy and remains true of all other major players. In operative terms as 
well, this new vision of multilateralism remains yet largely conceived within their more conventional framework of 
seeking only regime security through physical forces at the core their vision though Chinese officials and academics 
seem to be evolve new emphasizes on new paradigms about building regional and internal security with a motive of 
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undercutting the very basis of convention wisdom which underwrites the current US-led world order and its 
incumbent institutions and military alliances as the current basis of ensuring international insecurity.vii
As a result, last two decades have seen China’s leaders engage its Asian neighbors in several regional multilateral 
forums that range from Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the its annual summits with ASEAN as also several 
other regional and bilateral forums. Especially, since year 2003, US endorsement of China’s lead role in ‘Six Nation 
Talks’ on North Korea have catapulted Beijing into a different level altogether. Briefly, nuclear non-proliferation 
had so far been considered as (a) global problem and (b) one to be handled by super powers alone with US being on 
the lead forever. Though these ‘Six Nation Talks’ have not achieved any concrete results yet, they have 
demonstrated US endorsement of China’s multilateralism as principle that should guide international relations. But 
those who accuse the US of following a unilateral foreign policy, explain this as US ‘socialization’ of China in 
international relations which is said to have replaced their containment of China policy since early 1990s.viii Either 
way, this promises to go a long way in facilitating China’s quest for multilateralism in its foreign policy. 
Multilateralism in China’s IR Theory 
To begin with, unlike some of the leading Western institutions in the Western world, China’s international 
relations (IR) theory experts have not been on abstract thinking in general. In recent Chinese tradition, therefore, 
their academic thinking in IR has not been much different from (or simply follows) China’s official doctrine that 
guides its foreign policy making and initiatives. Nevertheless, in the recent past, China’s academic thinking has 
come to be a critical indicator of the coming changes in China’s official policy and doctrine. 
Beginning from China’s entry into the United Nations from 1970s, these seemed to provide the first visible 
indicators of an impending shift in China’s official line. Since then these remain a key indicator of China’s official 
vision in the making. This, of course, had its impact on the academic scene as well. China today has over forty well-
known universities with departments for international relations. Though, for long time, research and teaching in 
these departments was not considered as very satisfactory in the opinion of Chinese experts. One fundamental 
problem often cited was that of lack of coordination amongst different departments with most of them continuing to 
seek to achieve overlapping objectives and often falling short on relevant infrastructure and expertise on area of 
their primary interest. 
As regards, research in international relations theory, this is expected to focus on three things: (a) to discover the 
rules (b) to explain phenomena to create explanation for international relations (c) to predict according to the rules 
discovered and explanation created.ix With this shift in foreign policy vision from early 1980s as also China’s large 
size and its growing international profile, most IR experts were to begin to underline the need for keeping focus on 
the larger picture of China’s national priorities urging its universities and policy research institutions to orient their 
research on issues areas that are specific to their locale and region as part of the larger national effort.x For example 
Xinjiang University in China’s western regions could look at Central Asia while the Yunnan University in China’s 
south could look at South Asian region while some institutions like the National Defence University or Academy of 
Military Sciences would still keep a generic focus on strategic issues. And this was to show its results. For instance, 
beginning from 1997, Yunnan University was to gradually become the leading force behind sustaining a four nation 
forum for sub-regional cooperation amongst Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar.  
At the same time, however, central institutions like China Academy of Social Sciences and other Beijing based 
institutions were to sustain focus on generic issues thus indicating the evolution of China’s  changing perceptions 
about the larger picture. This, however, is not so unique about Chinese research institutions and universities. The 
same remains also true for the rest of the world, especially the developed world. From that perspective, China’s 
academics share several other traits with the developing world’s experts. Then, Chinese IR experts also share several 
limitations common to all experts around the world. For instance, none of the IR theorists were able to predict the 
collapse of former Soviet Union. This showed that despite their rapid and intense evolution during the post-War 
period, these IR experts have had their limitations. Not only these IR theories were not able to predict the nature and 
timings of the end of Cold War but they have since also been grappling in understanding the nature of post-cold war 
world order that has apparently taken sharp turn away from what had followed the World War II. For example, all 
the IR theories during the cold war had been so exclusively focused on elements of hard power-military and only 
marginally the economic component-and did not pay much attention to soft-power elements like power of ideas and 
institutions.xi
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Indeed, this is also extremely difficult to simplify things as different parts of the international system that 
continues to experience different levels in the evolution of international system and it is their respective experience 
that very often colors the visions of their respective experts. The same also remains true of multilateralism debates 
within Chinese IR experts. As a result, whether China’s foreign direct investment-driven-rapid-development today 
seeks to cater to its socialist proletariat or the foreign capitalist remains inconclusive debate. And, given their current 
complications of regional and ideological limitation and biases this becomes far more complicated. Besides, given 
the fluidity of international system, the variables have been changing too rapidly for the IR theories to grasp and 
incorporate these into their understanding of global affairs. But this has also resulted in increasing interface of 
Chinese scholars with the outside world and this makes these scholars far more amenable to accept newer paradigms 
of international relations. Constructivism, for example, has far more influence in explaining China’s multilateralism. 
It clearly caters for Chinese tendency to pursue something new, to challenge the tradition, and to reform incumbent 
international system which apparently favours neo-realism of the United States.xii The United States, on the other 
hand, perhaps have larger comfort level with realism and neo-realism schools of thought in IR theoretical research 
and in preserving the status quo. But trends in the academic thinking in the US have sure influenced China’s theory 
and practice in international relations. 
The New Theoretical Framework 
In an interesting contrast, in building its new theoretical framework for multilateralism, China seems to be 
increasingly following the beaten path of Western powers. While the West, it seems, is beginning to deemphasize 
nation-state sovereignty and United Europe has virtually come around as best possible example of these new trends, 
rising power and trend setters like China continue to increasingly emphasize on nation-state framework as was 
evolved by these European states as early as in 1648 at Westphalia. As a result, China’s emphasis on ‘territorial-
sovereignty’ and ‘sovereign-independence’ continue to define its national character and policy approach to 
multilateralism. This is true despite the fact that it was founded on a promise of providing a revolutionary alternative 
to nation-building to be guided by ideologies of Marxism-premised, not on national struggle but on class struggle 
which was viewed not in national but global framework. This had once defined the core of Mao’s New China which 
seems to have since evolved an altogether new contours and character.  
This new context seems to contribute a great deal in defining China’s new theoretical framework on 
multilateralism. To many, this appears to signal that China has shed its vision of being a revolutionary power and 
adopted a new avatar of being a status quoits power; virtually aping the United States. This has been partly caused 
by China’s rapid evolution in recent decades which has witnessed ground realities compelling evolution in its 
political system to keep pace with transformation in other sectors of its societal existence. But then change is the 
only permanent reality of our known universe. There can be several prominent examples on how, over the centuries, 
the nature of nation-state has been evolved; sometimes beyond recognition. This general principle is clearly 
reflected in China’s new theoretical framework on multilateralism. 
To briefly demarcate the evolving new contours of China’s understanding of multilateralism in foreign policy a 
general narrative could include the following— 
Firstly, the ever increasing pace of globalization has since been unfolding several newer contours compelling 
China to accommodate these changes into its theoretical premises of class-struggle. As globalization evolves and 
expends its influence, a whole set of new global perspectives seem to unfold continuously. This was something that 
had not been contemplated by the orthodox Marxism. Today the US proletariat, instead of becoming anti-US-capital, 
finds faults with China’s cheap labour-costs and finds common cause with US-capital which projects itself as victim 
of China’s dumping and undervaluation. This is beginning to unfold the new reality of ‘distinctions between 
different proletariat’ or intra-proletariat contradictions which have since resulted in China evolving a new 
understanding of international system and its theories on interdependence which does not believe in irreconcilable 
differences of comrade Lenin. 
Secondly, the non-state actors-like terrorists, multinational firms and especially NGOs-have since come to 
represent a new force both facilitating and enforcing multilateralism. In fact, they are emerging as the new critical 
political force in their own right seeking their own place and influence in international system. Many indeed believe 
that era of inter-state violence is soon going to be over as these non-state actors will become the greatest menace 
forcing States to come together. These non-State forces are beginning to show their influence in the decision-making 
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of nation-States and their influence is perhaps far more in the developed world. In China as well, these non-State 
forces are beginning to be visible. To some extent China has also been working to adopt to these new trends. The 
way Beijing had highlighted the international links of China’s SARS epidemic of 2003-which resulted in China 
obtaining $ 38 million in foreign aid to deal with this essentially domestic epidemic-was one clear reflection of this 
emerging new vision of China with its decreasing sanctimonious self image. 
Thirdly and more recently, non traditional threats to nation-state system (ruling regime in case of China) has itself 
come to be perhaps one most visible threat to the authority and legitimacy of nation-state. This seems to challenge 
nation-state’s primacy in the international system that has been the basis of international relations since the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 and even before. China accordingly is becoming far too much constrained and dependent on 
such new forces and factors than it ever had been even at the height of US policy of containment. This seem to 
confound even their earlier experiments like those with their Comintern-type multilateralism for the contours of new 
multilateral are determined by national interests and not by ideologies and belief systems. So far, China seems to be 
trying hard to balance between these two directions. 
Finally, the perennial march of Science and consequent proliferation of new technologies have itself created new 
variables in international system that fails to fit into conventional wisdom of international relations’ theories. Most 
of the conventional wisdom has been based on the primacy and supremacy of nation-State in the international 
system and this has been the hallmark of the international relations for past several centuries. And here,  
technologies-driven information revolution have extended as well as shrunk the conventional sense of both space 
and time and this shift of focus from territorial space-which has been cause of most inter-state conflicts-to cyber 
space is bound to transform the conventional thinking and reality of the international system. China’s new IR 
thinking and foreign policy also seem to gradually grapple these new forces and factors. 
But for many Chinese experts the reverse also remains equally true. There are many in China who believe that 
conventional wisdom of State being most fundamental unit of international system continues to be the rock-bottom 
of international relations. Especially, in the wake of 9.11 experience, these scholars in China are debating the thesis 
on whether the world has finally entered into a new phase of neo-medievalism. xiii  Realist understanding of 
international system seem to have been re-enforced both by these terrorist attacks as also by the global (read US) 
response to these new threats. This return of focus to the physical security and military means of national power and 
use of violence in terms of inter-state equations have indeed revived realist perspectives of international relations 
though there had been brief period of debates about the alternative approaches and peace dividends following the 
collapse of former Soviet Union. But in some ways, this has also generated serious thinking in China’s academic 
and policy circles to evolve more thorough basis for its multilateralism though some of these issues have been 
debated in the West at least since the early 1980s.xiv
China’s Formulations on Multilateralism 
To begin with, unlike most other countries, China’s policy formulations and even, to some extent its academic 
debates have often been both reflection of as also strongly guided by theories and thoughts propounded by China’s 
great leaders. While most times these leader’s visions have been the guiding light for China’s policy formulation, 
sometimes these have also been circumscribed by these leaders’ more immediate political compulsions. But more 
often these have been response to China’s internal and external conditions. For instance, all three of China’s 
paramount leaders-Mao, Deng, Jiang-have propounded their own theoretical understanding and explanations about 
China and its location and role in the international system thereby also eluding to their understanding of the nature 
of international system. 
Also, it is in this evolutionary nature of China’s theoretical interpretations of their worldview that China 
academics have found opportunities to not only elaborate but also suggest how to cope and accommodate changes. 
Consequently, this has provided China with far more flexible and evolving policy formulations both in its internal 
sphere as also in its interface with the international system. Even China’s fundamental ideology of socialism has 
witnessed transformations and displayed extreme flexibility to accommodate new challenges. This has greatly 
facilitated changes in China’s specifics like foreign policy or changes in its policy on multilateralism. Amongst 
others these changes have been symbolized by the expression ‘Chinese characteristics’ which has been a suffix for 
most policy formulations of Beijing. 
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In terms of providing theoretical understanding to multilateralism in the international system, the Chinese 
formulations have since moved from treating international politics as a zero-sum game in class-struggle terms to 
talking about peaceful ‘coexistence’ (gong cun) and these theoretical formulations have since moved to ‘winning-
together’ (gong ying).xv This shows how, pragmatism in supporting the status quo has since completely transformed 
China’s original ethos and virtually replaced its old revolutionary idealism about creating a world revolution without 
facing any internal contradictions. But many people in China still believe that this accommodation of Western 
discourse and leadership may be only a tactical compromise while China’s strategic goals remain the same of 
promoting revolutionary socialism. It is in this context that pragmatism of Deng Xiaoping have become the guiding 
principle of China’s induction of multilateralism as instrument of its foreign policy operations. 
But, in operative terms, China’s current phase of multilateralism can be traced not earlier than to mid-1990s. 
Before that China was not really interested in issue based and national-interest guided multilateralism. In the past, 
China had either been subject of containment and boycott by multilateral institutions or had suffered from its own 
regional divisions especially in case of Macao, Hong Kong as also much of its western provinces of Xinjiang and 
Tibet. It was only in the wake of new regionalism and globalization that China finally became more comfortable 
with multilateral forums from where this was to become its ‘strategic choice’ making it as synonymous to China’s 
foreign policy vision.xvi
Operative Policy Still Selective 
In actual operations, China’s theoretical formulations have found their own new challenges which have further 
re-defined its multilateralism. While at the global level-i.e. at forums like the United Nations or the World Trade 
Organisation-China has been pursuing principles of democracy and equality amongst nations, it has used this 
principle primarily to ensure restraint on behaviour of the United States which is seen to increasingly negate 
international norms and institutions. But at regional level China’s multilateralism seem to become less consistent 
with these values and vision and become more region specific as also guided by China’s interests and leverages as 
also by the changing ground situations from time to time. 
China’s multilateralism, for example, remains both most effective and original in Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). This is one organization that was evolved by China-along with Russia and three Central Asian 
republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan-and has shown impressive results in resolving border disputes 
and inter-state equations in this region. China has always projected it as ‘alternate paradigm’ of achieving security 
and peace and this has evolved mutual confidence to such an extent that SCO now debates about evolving common 
forces and joint strategies for joint exploitation of resources and so on. This has since been possible also as the new 
Russian Federation had been busy evolving its new profile and equations obtaining China leeway to lead this 
moment. The SCO has since been joined by Uzbekistan as its sixth member and is likely to expand further. 
China’s equations with the ASEAN represent another success story of its multilateralism. This is partly so 
because ASEAN itself has been the guiding light for promoting multilateralism in this region. The best part is that 
China’s transformation towards multilateralism since last decade or more has facilitated China-ASEAN engagement 
thereby eroding their confrontations though some of the irritants like claims on South China sea remain critical in 
defining their relations. Also, unlike China’s engagement in SCO, China’s multilateralism with ASEAN remains 
restricted to promoting confidence building measures and common security agenda. Also, this has been guided more 
by China’s desire to limit US influence on ASEAN and to ensure that US does not dictate decisions in this region. 
Therefore, China has often been urging for autonomy of ASEAN from that perspective. However, it still remains 
largely a talking shop and China has been reluctant on taking any hard decisions. In the end, this has since 
transformed China-ASEAN ties which remains a positive outcome. 
By comparison, China’s multilateralism remains almost non-existence in its ties with either West Asia-where it 
has stayed at safe distance knowing fully well US interest and influence in that region-or South Asia where for long 
time Pakistan had been its main partner and their main aim being to keep India tied down to South Asian politics. 
Though, China’s policy towards India has since moved from supporting insurgencies to evolving State-to-State ties 
and evolving a series of confidence building measures, yet China’s interest in South Asia’s multilateral forum like 
SAARC remains minimal and sporadic. In all these equations China still continues to put premium on bilateral 
relations with both West Asian and South Asian countries. 
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But China’s leading the Six Nation Talks on North Korea has lately been seen as a shot in arms of China’s fourth 
generation leaders’ vision of multilateralism. Amongst others, this is seen as US endorsement of China’s 
commitment and competence in leading the multilateral discussions on the nuclear proliferation crisis. Beginning 
from November 2002, these talks have been repeatedly hosted by Beijing. Even when this recent period has 
witnessed North Korea becoming more difficult to deal with and bolder (even reticent) about its nuclear capabilities 
this period has witnessed US not yet backtracking from its expressed faith in Beijing continuing to lead these 
negotiations. Especially, the post 9.11 events have also witnessed US willing to cooperate with China’s 
multilateralism. But expanding US military presence in China’s periphery during this period has also made China 
circumspect about how far to go in seeking to accommodate US and this has since seen new emphasis in multilateral 
forums like the Strategic Triangle of Russia-China-India and Beijing becoming far more active in coordinating their 
joint responses at the United Nations and on other issues; all being aimed at putting restraint on the US.xvii
China’s ‘Alternative Paradigm’ Thesis 
At the most fundamental level, beginning from early 1980s, China has gradually retreated from its old hat of 
confronting the West. Taking a cue from Khurushchev’s ‘peaceful coexistence’ but more particularly from 
Gorbachev’s perestroika and ‘new thinking’, Beijing had gradually come to accept supremacy of the United States 
in the international system. China today seem to have little discomfort in accepting United States power, and in 
many ways China is now trying to compete with US by using the same instruments and institutions that have 
promoting US writ. But, at the same time, China has also been working gradually to undermine the institutions and 
norms that make US the sole surviving super power of 21st century. 
China still continues to work hard to ensure that it is able to contribute to the popular desire to put restraints on 
the way that United States has come to use its power. And, China’s expressed intent of providing the world with 
alternative paradigms for building security and peace seem at least partly driven by this deep felt need to undermine 
US supremacy. For this purpose, China has been trying to dig at the very premises that make United States such a 
powerful country. China, for example, has sought to gradually and imperceptibly challenge the very understanding 
and relevance of power-politics of military alliances and sought to replace this zero-sum game of inter-State 
relations with new alternative paradigms based on mutual accommodation and mutual benefit. 
In this, China’s approach of multilateralism has since come to be recognized as its primary instrument of re-
organizing international relations for the coming times. It is this interpretation of China’s multilateralism that seem 
to make it quite a revolutionary proposition as the status quo seems to be one of US unilateralism. External realities 
of the collapse of former Soviet Union, Russia’s close relations with China, Russia’s sporadic enthusiasm to build 
bridges with Asian neighbours and the process of unification of European states all seem to have also facilitated 
China’s drive towards multilateralism. In fact the whole new trend of regionalism in international relations also 
seem to provide favourable groundings for the rise of multilateralism as an effective instrument of foreign policy 
and several new players seem to be finding their echo in China’s alternative paradigm of multilateralism. This 
obtains China some confidence to be able to pursue its quest for multilateralism with minimum compromises as also 
to use it effectively in ensuring its place in international decision-making. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, therefore, China seem to have had its own share of challenges and opportunities as also its own set 
of limitations and leverages in dealing with several forces guiding its course amongst a whole range of possible 
alternatives for making its policies. It is in this context that China have gradually moved from ideology of Marxism 
to ideology of pragmatism thus making multilateralism as the core of its foreign policy since the reign of Deng 
Xiaoping. 
In operative terms, of course, beginning from China’s entry into the United Nations, a new era of China’s 
participation in multilateral forums had begun though this was to remain subdued for long time. It was only later, 
from mid-1990s, in face of US unilateralism, that this was to take shape of China’s quest for multilateralism as 
means for achieving its foreign policy objectives. To quote one Chinese scholar— 
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China believes in a set of principles in international affairs, while consideration of its national interests causes Beijing to make a pragmatic compromise 
from time to time. Beijing has long been accustomed to dealing with others in bilateral settings while the post-Cold War era is witnessing a rise of 
multilateralism in international politics, which is bringing more and more pressure on China’s traditional diplomacy.xviii
 Lately, Russia has been particularly active in promoting this multilateralism in order to revive its stature of 
earlier years. And, in all its such efforts, China remains its major partner in pushing for strategic partnerships and 
multilateralism. Towards the end of 2004, President Putin had made several important visits to some of the 
emerging major power like Brazil, India, and China professing Russia’s belief in evolving multilateralism as 
instrument of achieving peace and order. Amongst several such initiatives, President Putin’s joint statement with 
Indian Prime Minister had included a whole paragraph on the subject of evolving Strategic Triangle amongst 
Russia-China-India which clearly indicates to this strengthening trends for multilateralism. To quote from that India-
Russia joint statement- 
The Sides note with satisfaction that the Trilateral Meetings at the Foreign Ministers level of India, China and Russia have been taking place regularly. 
These meetings hae been useful in promoting an understanding and exploring areas of possible cooperation at a trilateral level and at an international level. 
The Trilateral Meetings have also reflected a strong concern against terrorism anywhere and in any form. The Sides express their conviction in favour of 
progressive increase in the trilateral cooperation, which could also result in social and economic development amongst the three countries.xix
In sum therefore, it is not just the US which has over time begun to endorse certain strands of China’s 
multilateralism, other power like Russia and India (also also European States) have also come to accept China’s 
credentials on multilateralism. Meanwhile, following the return of Hong Kong and Macao China has also 
consolidated its internal regional provinces and it feels far more secure in dealing with its immediate neighbors as 
also with other major players in international system. All this clearly augurs well for the future of China’s continued 
quest for evolving multilateralism as the key principle and instrument in its foreign policy. However, how much of 
this will be a Chinese contribution or how much of it will be like aping the West will remain open to questions and 
interpretations for a long time. 
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